



Four Policy Priorities for Parliament's Return

Sean Speer and Taylor Jackson

This study was commissioned by the Centre for Civic Engagement. The CCE is a non-partisan Canadian charity dedicated to conducting original research on public policy issues related to Canadian prosperity, productivity, and national flourishing. The CCE's research informs an active program of policy seminars, events, conferences, and lectures all aimed at providing the policy making community with actionable insights that encourage informed decision making on issues that matter to Canadians.

Introduction

As the federal parliament returns from its summer break, there's a lot of political speculation about an impending election, but less attention is being paid to the myriad of public policy issues confronting parliamentarians.

Yet, we're living in a moment of big economic, social, and geopolitical questions. Canadian policymakers must be cognizant of the opportunities and challenges facing the country and put forward policy proposals that are proportionate to them.

In order to situate the fall parliamentary sitting, we've compiled four short essays from leading experts on some of the policy issues that are likely to animate its deliberations.

These include: balancing the federal budget, fostering productivity growth, reforming temporary immigration programs, and responding to rising American protectionism.

Parliament Should Work Toward Budget Balance for the Sake of Canadians

By Jake Fuss and Grady Munro, economists at the Fraser Institute.

A key question for the Trudeau government and parliamentarians more generally concerns Ottawa's deficit spending and debt accumulation. There's an urgent need to put forward a credible plan to balance the federal budget.

In 2024–25, it's expected the Trudeau government will run its 10th consecutive budget deficit, primarily due to high levels of spending. Indeed, Prime Minister Trudeau has overseen the six highest years of program spending in Canadian history (2018–2023)—even after excluding COVID-related spending—on a per-person basis adjusted for inflation.¹ And deficits and high spending are expected to continue for the foreseeable future.²

Consequently, since 2015–16, federal gross debt has approximately doubled from \$1.1 trillion to an expected \$2.1 trillion by the end of 2024–25. While a growing debt burden ultimately means higher taxes on future generations, it also today means higher debt interest costs, which have similarly more than doubled since 2015–16.³ In fact, this year, more than \$1 in every \$10 the federal government collects in revenues will be used to service debt rather than provide services or tax relief for Canadians.⁴

Given the risks associated with persistent spending-driven deficits, parliamentarians should focus on balancing the budget. The chart below shows how to achieve that goal.

Specifically, if the federal government limited growth in annual program spending (total spending minus debt interest) to 0.2 per cent for two years (beginning in 2025–26), it could balance the budget by 2027–28. Once the budget is balanced, the government could resume increasing spending at a quicker pace and still run a surplus in 2028–29.

During the mid-1990s, the Chrétien Liberal government employed a similar approach to balance the budget for the first time in three decades and avoid a fiscal crisis. The government reviewed all areas of federal spending with the twin objectives of eliminating the deficit and ensuring Canadians received value for their tax dollars.⁵ By balancing the budget through a shift towards smaller and smarter government spending, the Chrétien government's reforms helped create a decade of balanced budgets, tax relief and overall economic success.⁶

¹ Jake Fuss, *Prime Ministers and Government Spending: 2023 Edition*, (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2023), <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/prime-ministers-and-government-spending-2023.pdf>.

² Department of Finance, *Budget 2024*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2024), <https://budget.canada.ca/2024/report-rapport/budget-2024.pdf>.

³ Jake Fuss and Grady Munro, *The Growing Debt Burden for Canadians: 2024 Edition*, (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2024), <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/growing-debt-burden-for-canadians-2024.pdf>.

⁴ Finance, *Budget 2024*.

⁵ Lydia Miljan, Tegan Hill and Niels Veldhuis, "Spending Reductions and Reform: Bases for the Success of the 1995 Budget," in *The Budget That Changed Canada: Essays on the 25th Anniversary of the 1995 Budget*, ed. William Watson and Jason Clemens (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2020), 11–17, <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/chapter2-spending-reductions-and-reform.pdf>.


⁶ Jason Clemens et al., *End of the Chrétien Consensus?*, (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2017), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Chretien_Consensus_Book.pdf.

There are clear benefits to balancing the budget.

First, it will help slow the rate of federal debt accumulation. As noted in the chart, balancing the budget would allow the federal government to avoid accumulating \$64.2 billion of additional debt. Second, a balanced budget will provide fiscal room to deliver tax relief for Canadians. Given the average Canadian family spends more on taxes than on basic necessities, tax relief would provide a meaningful boost for families struggling to pay the bills.⁷

With the fall session getting underway, parliamentarians face political uncertainty and several important policy issues. In light of the sorry state of federal finances, balancing the budget should be a top priority.

Planned Federal Fiscal Balance vs. Alternative Fiscal Balance, 2025/26 to 2028/29



Sources: Federal Budget 2024; calculations by authors

⁷ Jake Fuss and Callum MacLeod, *Taxes versus the Necessities of Life: The Canadian Consumer Tax Index, 2024 edition*, (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2024), <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/canadian-consumer-tax-index-2024.pdf>.

The “Productivity Problem” Is Bigger Than Canada

By Alicia Planincic, economist and manager of policy
at the Business Council of Alberta

Canada’s standard of living is stagnating, and productivity—the only real way to fix it—is (rightfully) at the centre of the conversation. Conferences have spun up, policy departments have been established, and, more recently, a new federal working group was announced—all in an effort to address the problem.⁸

For those following closely, it may seem like no stone is being left unturned. From the role of industry dynamics to interprovincial trade to the potential effects of immigration and even why some productivity measures might look worse than others.⁹ This is all good; the more people, ideas, and thoughts behind it, the better.

But one point lost in the conversation is that this productivity slowdown isn’t unique to Canada; it’s global. To be sure, Canada’s recent record has been particularly bad. However, productivity growth has been weak across the G7 for decades.¹⁰ In fact, virtually every rich country in the world has seen slower productivity growth in recent decades compared to the period from the 1920s to the 1970s.

So, while Canadians may feel bombarded by headlines about *Canada’s* productivity problem, a Google search of “Productivity Growth [insert country name]” shows we’re not alone. Much has been written on the issue from other perspectives, from “The UK Productivity Paralysis” to “The German Productivity Paradox” to “Why is Europe Losing the Productivity Race” and “Australia’s Woeful Productivity Sinks Living Standards,” to name a few.¹¹

Oftentimes, these analyses compare productivity growth to that of the US, the one country that has managed to buck the trend at certain points in recent history (namely, in the late 1990s and early 2000s).¹²

⁸ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Ministers Anand and LeBlanc announce next steps in increasing productivity and reducing regulatory barriers to strengthen the economy,” *Government of Canada*, August 27, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/news/2024/08/ministers-anand-and-leblanc-announce-next-steps-in-increasing-productivity-and-reducing-regulatory-barriers-to-strengthen-the-economy.html>.

⁹ Trevor Tombe, “Canada’s resource sector is its productivity powerhouse,” *The Hub*, July 11, 2024, <https://thehub.ca/2024/07/11/trevor-tombe-canadas-resource-sector-is-its-productivity-powerhouse/>; Andrew Coyne, “The productivity puzzle: How could we be doing so poorly? We did everything right!,” *The Globe and Mail*, March 22, 2024, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-productivity-puzzle-how-could-we-be-doing-so-poorly-we-did/>; Matthew Doyle, Mikal Skuterud and Christopher Worswick, “The Economics of Canadian Immigration Levels,” *University of Waterloo, Canadian Labour Economics Forum Working Paper Series*, No. 58, (2023), <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/273069/1/1850742715.pdf>; Oliver Loertscher and Pau S. Pujolas, “Canadian productivity growth: Stuck in the oil sands,” *Canadian Journal of Economics* 57, no.2 (2024): 478–501.

¹⁰ Ezra Greenberg, Asutosh Padhi and Sven Smit, “2024 and beyond: Will it be economic stagnation or the advent of productivity-driven abundance?,” *McKinsey & Company*, January 12, 2024, <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/2024-and-beyond-will-it-be-economic-stagnation-or-the-advent-of-productivity-driven-abundance>.

¹¹ Larissa Marioni and Adria Pabst, “The UK Productivity Paralysis,” *National Institute of Economic and Social Research*, September 9, 2024, <https://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/uk-productivity-paralysis>; Christoph Schmidt et al., “The German productivity paradox: A homegrown affair,” *VoxEU*, November 22, 2021, <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/german-productivity-paradox-homegrown-affair>; Barry Eichengreen, “Why is Europe losing the productivity race?,” *The Japan Times*, April 10, 2024, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/04/10/world/europe-losing-productivity-race/>; Leith van Onselen, “Australia’s woeful productivity sinks living standards,” *Macrobusiness*, September 5, 2024, <https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2024/09/australias-woeful-productivity-sinks-living-standards/>.

¹² “America’s economic outperformance is a marvel to behold,” *The Economist*, April 13, 2023, <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/13/from-strength-to-strength>; Charles Atkins et al., “Rekindling US productivity for a new era,” *McKinsey Global Institute*, February 16, 2023, <https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/rekindling-us-productivity-for-a-new-era>.


But even the US is failing to show the level of dynamism that it once did and, as they see it, they too have been experiencing a productivity slowdown for many years.¹³

There are many reasons for the global decline.¹⁴ Certain factors that drove earlier improvements—like a more highly educated workforce—may have run their course. Likewise, services industries (where most employment now lies) haven't been able to deliver the same productivity gains as the transition from agriculture to manufacturing did in the past. So far, the new technologies that could increase productivity (e.g., 5G, big data, AI) have yet to yield the efficiencies for office workers that mass production techniques and electricity did for factory workers.

To be sure, some businesses are keeping pace with the productivity growth of the past. Interestingly, it's not necessarily the ones that invest the most but rather the ones that use their resources (capital and labour) most efficiently.¹⁵ However, there is a growing divergence between the best and the rest, which fall substantially behind.¹⁶

That said, just because other countries face a similar challenge doesn't mean Canada doesn't have a problem. Canada's productivity slowdown has been especially noticeable since the mid-2010s and has already had a very real effect on Canadians' standard of living. But fixating on the gap in growth between Canada and the US, while real and concerning, may miss the bigger point: that strong productivity growth may be harder to capture than in the past, and we may need to challenge ourselves to think a little differently if we want to solve this problem.

Labour Productivity Growth - Average Annual Growth Rate



Source: Bergeaud, A., Cette, G. and Lecat, R. (2016), updated with latest data through 2019

¹³ Ezra Klein, "Technology is changing how we live, but it needs to change how we work," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/a/new-economy-future/technology-productivity>; Robert J. Gordon, "Off Its Pinnacle," *International Monetary Fund*, June 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/gordon.htm>; "The U.S. productivity slowdown: an economy-wide and industry-level analysis," *US Bureau of Labor Statistics*, April 2021, <https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2021/article/the-us-productivity-slowdown-the-economy-wide-and-industry-level-analysis.htm>.

¹⁴ "When trends aren't a straight line of progress (part two): Productivity—why global progress has stalled," *Business Council of Alberta*, March 2, 2021, <https://businesscouncilab.com/insights-category/analysis/productivity-part-two-why-global-progress-has-stalled/>.

¹⁵ Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo and Peter N. Gal, "The global productivity slowdown, technology divergence, and public policy: A firm level perspective," *Brookings*, September 27, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-global-productivity-slowdown-technology-divergence/>.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

It's Time for the Federal Government to Get Serious About Immigration Reform

By Mike Moffatt, senior director of the Smart Prosperity Institute

In the last three-and-a-half years, our population has grown by 3 million people, the level the country typically experiences in a decade, and slightly more than Canada experienced in the entire 1990s.¹⁷ This level of growth is only sustainable if infrastructure and housing construction experienced similar increases. They did not, leaving our healthcare system underfunded and growing Canada's shortfall of homes by nearly one million units. Addressing this must be a top priority of the government this fall.

Nearly all of Canada's net population growth comes from international migration. Increases in Canada's permanent resident immigration targets, from 250,000 to 500,000 a year, played a role, but the larger driver was a massive increase in non-permanent residents, from temporary foreign workers and international students. As I remarked to Cabinet, "our immigration system has shifted away from adding to the skills and cultural vibrancy of Canada to creating an underclass of guest workers. It has become a tool to allow provinces to cut funding to higher education."¹⁸

The staggering growth in non-permanent residents is a *net* increase in that it's the difference between the number of new incoming residents on time-expiring visas, subtracting out those who leave the country and those who gain permanent residency.

Canada's opportunity to address this situation will come with this November's release of the 2025–2027 immigration levels. I will judge the new plan a success if it does the following three things:

1. In March, the federal government committed to decreasing Canada's non-permanent resident population, which is currently 2.8 million, down to 2.1 million over three years.¹⁹ The federal government should commit to annual reductions in non-permanent residents by 250,000 each year for the next seven years. By the end of 2031, Canada's non-permanent resident population would be one million persons, returning to the levels last seen in 2017.
2. The federal government should temporarily reduce the annual permanent resident target to around 300,000 persons per year. Coupled with the non-permanent resident population shrinking by 250,000 a year, Canada's population growth would be effectively zero, giving the country time for infrastructure and housing to catch up to past population growth.

¹⁷ Mike Moffatt, "My remarks to the federal cabinet on housing, immigration, and the temporary foreign worker program," *The Hub*, August 27, 2024, <https://thehub.ca/2024/08/27/mike-moffatt-my-remarks-to-the-federal-cabinet-on-housing-immigration-and-the-temporary-foreign-worker-program/>.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*


¹⁹ Marc Miller, "Speaking notes for the Honourable Marc Miller, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship: Announcement related to Temporary Residents," *Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada*, last modified March 21, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2024/03/speaking-notes-for-the-honourable-marc-miller-minister-of-immigration-refugees-and-citizenship-announcement-related-to-temporary-residents.html>.

The plan should outline how the federal government, in conjunction with other orders of government, will address the current shortages in housing. The plan should give an estimate of the existing housing shortfall and provide annual targets for homebuilding. Once that shortfall is closed, immigration targets should be raised back up to 500,000, or potentially higher, if conditions allow.

This may be characterized otherwise, but this is a pro-immigration approach. Despite recent population growth, the status quo is not pro-immigration. Shifting Canada's immigration system towards a system of temporary guest workers with few rights, which the United Nations has characterized as "a breeding ground for contemporary forms of slavery," is not pro-immigration.²⁰ It is not pro-immigration to invite newcomers to our country and not ensure they have access to the housing, healthcare, and education they need to succeed. Pro-immigration should never be pro-exploitation.

The federal policymakers have the opportunity to reform the immigration system to make it work better for both newcomers and Canadians. They need to take it.

Canada: Number of New Immigrants (Permanent Residents) and Net New Non-Permanent Residents by Calendar Year



²⁰ Luca Caruso-Moro, "Canada's foreign worker program a 'breeding ground for contemporary slavery,' says UN report," *CTV News*, August 13, 2024, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-s-foreign-worker-program-a-breeding-ground-for-contemporary-slavery-says-un-report-1.6999244>; Tomoya Obokata, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences: visit to Canada*, (Geneva: The United Nations, 2024), <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/120/97/pdf/g2412097.pdf>.

Adjusting to the New Washington Consensus on Trade

By the Wilson Center's Canada Institute's Christopher Sands and Xavier Delgado

The 2024 US elections will reinforce trends in US trade policy that began in 2016 and solidified with bipartisan support in 2020. The next US administration, regardless of who wins, will seek to reshore jobs and production from China and prioritize enforcement of existing trade commitments over negotiating new agreements. The big spending industrial policies shaped by recent Congresses will continue, though the industries receiving support may shift depending on the election outcome.

Canada has so far responded to these changes with piecemeal strategies, hoping for a return to pre-2016 norms. Since that is unlikely, and despite Canada's significant reliance on trade with the US, Members of the 44th Parliament should prepare Canadians to adjust by engaging in an honest debate about the changes in US thinking in five areas.

- 1. Buy American and Canadian Content.** Domestic content requirements have been used by both countries, notably by the United States for defence procurement and by Canada for the promotion of Canadian culture. The difference is that the United States typically applies set-asides as a condition of government financial support, whereas Canada is prone to establish content quotas as a precondition for government licensing or permits. These patterns are engrained on both sides of the border and unlikely to change.
- 2. Industrial Policy.** The critique of industrial policy, which argues it leads to inefficient resource allocation because it favours friends of the government, applies to both countries. However, the Biden administration's novel industrial policy offers incentives to any private firm that qualifies by responding to a public sector priority, even foreign firms. For instance, the United States has financed Canadian-owned firms working in the US and even invested directly in critical minerals projects in Canada.²¹
- 3. Dispute Resolution.** In terms of disputes, former US Ambassador to Canada Bruce Heyman observed that Americans prefer litigation, while Canadians prefer negotiation. This difference often leads to a stalemate when the US refuses to bargain and Canada drags its feet on a previous commitment. In implementing the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the US has pushed Canada to fully open its dairy market as agreed, while disregarding the USMCA panel rejecting the US interpretation of the formula for calculating the automotive rules of origin, daring Canada to sue.²²

²¹ Alexander Panetta, "What's behind a historic, unusual U.S. military cash transfer to Canadian mines," *CBC News*, May 26, 2024, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-dpa-money-mines-canada-analysis-1.7214664>.


²² *USMCA Panel Releases Canada Dairy Report; Biden–Harris Administration Will Continue Seeking Full USMCA Benefits for U.S. Dairy*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2023), <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/november/usmca-panel-releases-canada-dairy-report-biden-harris-administration-will-continue-seeking-full>; "USMCA panel rules against US position in automotive origin dispute," *PWC*, January 2023, <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/library/usmca-panel-rules-against-us-position-in-auto-origin-dispute.html>.

4. Further Trade Liberalization. Congress last granted trade negotiating authority to an administration in 2015, and it expired in 2021.²³ Without new negotiating authority the United States could not renegotiate the USMCA, only withdraw from it. That is unlikely: USMCA approval garnered bipartisan majorities in Congress and praise from Trump and Biden even though as senator, Kamala Harris voted against it.

5. Security Still Trumps Trade. Former US Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci's blunt expression of US priorities still applies. Both Democrats and Republicans support efforts to develop critical minerals, increase defence spending, and impose sanctions on adversaries like China and Russia.²⁴ Canada will benefit most from its integration into US defence supply chains if it remains closely aligned with Washington in Great Power rivalries.

The new Washington consensus on trade combines economic nationalism with political pragmatism to overcome partisan polarization and get things done. Ahead of a Canadian federal election in 2025, MPs should be clear-eyed and creative in debating Canada's economic future. An Ottawa consensus about relations with the United States eschewing partisanship and ideology would serve Canadian interests well.

Canada and US Trade Reliance as a Share of Global Trade, 1991-2021



Source: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution

²³ Christopher A. Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, *Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2024), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10038>.

²⁴ Terry Weber, "U.S. ambassador warns 'security trumps trade' in wake of Iraq war," *The Globe and Mail*, March 25, 2003, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/us-ambassador-warns-security-trumps-trade-in-wake-of-iraq-war/article20448301/>.

Key Takeaways

While all eyes will be on politics upon parliament's return, parliamentarians shouldn't lose sight of the policy challenges gripping the country. Almost two-thirds of Canadians think the country is headed in the wrong direction, and concerns about the rising cost of living, the economy, immigration, and Canada's place in the world high.²⁵

Against this backdrop, we gathered a group of leading policy experts to discuss what parliamentarians should be thinking about heading into the Fall sitting. Each part touches on key issues that matter to Canadians, including:

- Balancing the budget and righting Canada's fiscal ship
- Developing a set of made-in-Canada policies to address our productivity woes
- Reforming temporary and permanent immigration to be more sustainable
- Beginning to seriously think about Canada's national interests and how those are best achieved amid rising US protectionism

Parliamentarians would do well to focus on these issues and develop a substantive policy agenda that addresses the issues that matter most to Canadians.

²⁵ Eddie Sheppard and David Coletto, "What is Motivating Voting Preferences in Canada?," *Abacus Data*, July 5, 2024, <https://abacusdata.ca/what-is-driving-voting-preferences-in-canada/>; "Federal Politics: Concern over immigration quadruples over last 24 months," *Angus Reid Institute*, September 4, 2024, <https://angusreid.org/federal-politics-concern-over-immigration-quadruples-over-last-48-months/>.

Bibliography

"America's economic outperformance is a marvel to behold." *The Economist*, April 13, 2023.

<https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/13/from-strength-to-strength>.

"Federal Politics: Concern over immigration quadruples over last 24 months." *Angus Reid Institute*, September 4, 2024.

<https://angusreid.org/federal-politics-concern-over-immigration-quadruples-over-last-48-months/>.

"The U.S. productivity slowdown: an economy-wide and industry-level analysis." *US Bureau of Labor Statistics*, April 2021.

<https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2021/article/the-us-productivity-slowdown-the-economy-wide-and-industry-level-analysis.htm>.

"USMCA panel rules against US position in automotive origin dispute." *PWC*, January 2023.

<https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/library/usmca-panel-rules-against-us-position-in-auto-origin-dispute.html>.

"When trends aren't a straight line of progress (part two): Productivity—why global progress has stalled."

Business Council of Alberta, March 2, 2021.

<https://businesscouncilab.com/insights-category/analysis/productivity-part-two-why-global-progress-has-stalled/>.

Andrews, Dan, Chiara Criscuolo and Peter N. Gal. "The global productivity slowdown, technology divergence, and public policy: A firm level perspective." *Brookings*, September 27, 2016.

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-global-productivity-slowdown-technology-divergence/>.

Atkins, Charles, et al. "Rekindling US productivity for a new era." *McKinsey Global Institute*, February 16, 2023.

<https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/rekindling-us-productivity-for-a-new-era>.

Caruso-Moro, Luca. "Canada's foreign worker program a 'breeding ground for contemporary slavery,' says UN report."

CTV News, August 13, 2024. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-s-foreign-worker-program-a-breeding-ground-for-contemporary-slavery-says-un-report-1.6999244>.

Casey, Christopher A., and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs. *Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2024. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10038>.

Clemens, Jason, et al. *End of the Chrétien Consensus?* Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2017.

https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Chretien_Consensus_Book.pdf.

Coyne, Andrew. "The productivity puzzle: How could we be doing so poorly? We did everything right!"

The Globe and Mail, March 22, 2024.

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-productivity-puzzle-how-could-we-be-doing-so-poorly-we-did/>.

Department of Finance. *Budget 2024*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2024.

<https://budget.canada.ca/2024/report-rapport/budget-2024.pdf>.

Doyle, Matthew, Mikal Skuterud and Christopher Worswick. "The Economics of Canadian Immigration Levels."

University of Waterloo, Canadian Labour Economics Forum Working Paper Series, No. 58, (2023).

<https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/273069/1/1850742715.pdf>.

Eichengreen, Barry. "Why is Europe losing the productivity race?" *The Japan Times*, April 10, 2024.

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/04/10/world/europe-losing-productivity-race/>.

Fuss, Jake, and Callum MacLeod. *Taxes versus the Necessities of Life: The Canadian Consumer Tax Index*, 2024 edition.

Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2024. <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/canadian-consumer-tax-index-2024.pdf>.

Fuss, Jake, and Grady Munro. *The Growing Debt Burden for Canadians: 2024 Edition*. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2024.

<https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/growing-debt-burden-for-canadians-2024.pdf>.

Fuss, Jake. *Prime Ministers and Government Spending: 2023 Edition*. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2023.

<https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/prime-ministers-and-government-spending-2023.pdf>.

Gordon, Robert J. "Off Its Pinnacle." *International Monetary Fund*, June 2016.
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2016/06/gordon.htm>;

Greenberg, Ezra, Asutosh Padhi and Sven Smit. "2024 and beyond: Will it be economic stagnation or the advent of productivity-driven abundance?" *McKinsey & Company*, January 12, 2024.
<https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/2024-and-beyond-will-it-be-economic-stagnation-or-the-advent-of-productivity-driven-abundance>.

Klein, Ezra. "Technology is changing how we live, but it needs to change how we work." *Vox*.
<https://www.vox.com/a/new-economy-future/technology-productivity>;

Loertscher, Oliver, and Pau S. Pujolas. "Canadian productivity growth: Stuck in the oil sands." *Canadian Journal of Economics* 57, no.2 (2024): 478-501.

Marioni, Larissa, and Adria Pabst. "The UK Productivity Paralysis." *National Institute of Economic and Social Research*, September 9, 2024. <https://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/uk-productivity-paralysis>.

Miljan, Lydia, Tegan Hill and Niels Veldhuis. "Spending Reductions and Reform: Bases for the Success of the 1995 Budget." In *The Budget That Changed Canada: Essays on the 25th Anniversary of the 1995 Budget*, edited by William Watson and Jason Clemens. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2020, 11-17.
<https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/chapter2-spending-reductions-and-reform.pdf>.

Miller, Marc. "Speaking notes for the Honourable Marc Miller, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship: Announcement related to Temporary Residents." *Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada*, last modified March 21, 2024.
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2024/03/speaking-notes-for-the-honourable-marc-miller-minister-of-immigration-refugees-and-citizenship-announcement-related-to-temporary-residents.html>.

Moffatt, Mike. "My remarks to the federal cabinet on housing, immigration, and the temporary foreign worker program." *The Hub*, August 27, 2024. <https://thehub.ca/2024/08/27/mike-moffatt-my-remarks-to-the-federal-cabinet-on-housing-immigration-and-the-temporary-foreign-worker-program/>.

Obokata, Tomoya. *Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences: visit to Canada*. Geneva: The United Nations, 2024. <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/120/97/pdf/g2412097.pdf>.

Panetta, Alexander. "What's behind a historic, unusual U.S. military cash transfer to Canadian mines." *CBC News*, May 26, 2024. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-dpa-money-mines-canada-analysis-1.7214664>.

Schmidt, Christoph, et al. "The German productivity paradox: A homegrown affair." *VoxEU*, November 22, 2021.
<https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/german-productivity-paradox-homegrown-affair>.

Sheppard, Eddie, and David Coletto. "What is Motivating Voting Preferences in Canada?" *Abacus Data*, July 5, 2024.
<https://abacusdata.ca/what-is-driving-voting-preferences-in-canada/>.

Tombe, Trevor. "Canada's resource sector is its productivity powerhouse." *The Hub*, July 11, 2024.
<https://thehub.ca/2024/07/11/trevor-tombe-canadas-resource-sector-is-its-productivity-powerhouse/>.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. "Ministers Anand and LeBlanc announce next steps in increasing productivity and reducing regulatory barriers to strengthen the economy." *Government of Canada*, August 27, 2024.
<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/news/2024/08/ministers-anand-and-leblanc-announce-next-steps-in-increasing-productivity-and-reducing-regulatory-barriers-to-strengthen-the-economy.html>.

USMCA Panel Releases Canada Dairy Report; Biden-Harris Administration Will Continue Seeking Full USMCA Benefits for U.S. Dairy. Washington, D.C.: Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2023.
<https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/november/usmca-panel-releases-canada-dairy-report-biden-harris-administration-will-continue-seeking-full>.

van Onselen Leith. "Australia's woeful productivity sinks living standards." *Macrobusiness*, September 5, 2024.
<https://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2024/09/australias-woeful-productivity-sinks-living-standards/>.

Weber, Terry. "U.S. ambassador warns 'security trumps trade' in wake of Iraq war." *The Globe and Mail*, March 25, 2003.
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/us-ambassador-warns-security-trumps-trade-in-wake-of-iraq-war/article20448301/>.

Sean Speer is the editor-at-large at The Hub. He previously served as a senior adviser to former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

Taylor Jackson is the research manager at The Hub. He is also a Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of Toronto. He has worked with several think tanks in Canada and the U.S. and previously served as a senior advisor to the Ontario Minister of Finance.